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Has the implementation of steel tariffs under the Trump Administration 
improved the production and profitability of the steel industry and increased 
employment? A brief history of America’s steel industry is provided to give an 
overview and perspective of more recent trends of the industry. This thesis then reviews 
the concepts of tariffs and globalization and explains how Trump implemented tariffs 
within the context of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and contrary to decades 
of efforts to ease worldwide trade. Three domestic steel companies are analyzed for the 
effects from the “232 tariffs”. A geopolitical evaluation of Chinese steel production and 
trade are described to give context to how tariffs might operate in this era of 
globalization. It remains too soon to ascertain whether the 232 tariffs helped the 
industry and comprehensive analysis is complicated by the global pandemic. However, 
the Biden administration has not yet lifted the tariffs and appears to support them. 
Domestic steel production can’t be viewed in isolation and without evaluation of 
international politics and production. Tariffs may boost domestic production and 
profitability in the long run. New technology may preclude the need for hiring and may 
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I. Introduction  
A. A Desire to Help America’s Working Class  
The United States economy performed well during the years leading up to 
Trump’s presidency when he promised that he would “Make America Great Again.” 
Overall GDP growth was steady, inflation remained low, and the technology and health 
care sectors boomed. But other sectors of the economy lagged badly, with the steel 
industry doing especially poorly in comparison to previous decades. Trump specifically 
invoked protectionist language when he spoke to the discouraged working-class of 
America in his inaugural address when he proclaimed “Every decision on trade, on 
taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit American workers and 
American families. We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries 
making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will 
lead to great prosperity and strength.”1 Earlier in his speech, he alluded to American 
factories being closed, workers being left behind, and middle-class Americans being 
stripped of their wealth. In theory, there are many ways to increase the number of jobs 
in an economy, however, Trump insisted on reclaiming American manufacturing jobs 
or re-negotiating trade deals with some of our closest (and largest) economic allies.2 
This pro-American method of job regeneration is argued over and disputed in academic 
circles. Many scholars believe that protectionism only harms American workers and the 
domestic economy. This thesis reviews whether protectionist policies helped the steel 
                                                        
1 Politico Staff, “Full Text: 2017 Donald Trump Inauguration Speech Transcript,” Politico, January 20, 
2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/full-text-donald-trump-inauguration-speech-transcript-
233907 




industry, which has been a bedrock of our country’s industrialization and success in the 
past and has implications in the re-building of our infrastructure and so for the 
continued success of our future. Did Trump’s rollout of protectionist policies lead to a 
recovery of production, profitability, and employment numbers in the American steel 
industry? Did these tariffs help steel companies or steel workers, or both, or neither? 
B. A Brief History of Steel Production in the U.S.  
Steel is an alloy; a mixture of iron and other metals that is used in buildings, 
roads, bridges, tools, ships, cars, machines, appliances, and weapons. Because steel is 
used in so many ways, its production has been an indicator of economic development. 
The United States had been a dominant force in the global steel market since the 19th 
century. Steel production began to ramp up in the decades following the civil war. In 
the 1880ies annual production was 1.25 million tons, which grew to 10 million tons by 
1900 and 24 million tons by 1910. These large quantities made the United States the 
biggest steel producing country at the time and amounted to almost 40% of global steel 
output.3 As industrial advancements continued well into the 20th century, both domestic 
and international demand for steel continued to increase, especially in the years 
following World War II. The destruction and devastation caused by the war resulted in 
many foreign countries relying on U.S. steel to revitalize their crippled infrastructures, 
which made domestic steel production quite profitable.  
                                                        







While the steel industry is still important to our domestic economy, its influence 
has waned greatly. “Crude steel production in 2018 totaled about 73% of 1970 
production levels while global production has tripled over that time span. As of March 
2018, American steel mills employed about 83,000 workers, while employment 
regularly exceeded 700,000 workers throughout the 1950s”, according to the BDO, an 
international accounting firm.4 Such a large reduction in steel employment is the result 
of a number of factors including technological advancements and increased foreign 
production. European, Asian, and South American countries have increased their steel 
production as they rebuilt their economies and infrastructures. More recently the World 
Steel Organization has produced totals for overall U.S. steel production, which has 
declined from 120 million tons of steel in 1970 to just over 70 million tons of steel in 
2020. For the last five decades, the output of domestic steel has steadily declined.5
 
                                                        
4 Bartholomew, “Steel and its Place in the American Economy.” 
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 While U.S. steel production has declined in the last 50 years, it is also 
worthwhile to examine whether the domestic steel production utilization rate has fallen 
as well. Utilization rate is output index divided by capacity index; what the industry has 
produced over what it can produce. As U.S. steel production decreased and foreign 
production increased, large steel mills across the country have closed. So now domestic 
production is produced by smaller “specialty” steel mills. These small steel mills, 
although productive, cannot produce at the levels that the larger mills can, which has 
resulted in a decade of lower levels of utilization.6 Several institutions that specialize in 
analysis of our steel industries, conclude that over the last five years the steel industry in 
the U.S. has shrunk 4.4% year over year.7 The almost five percent drop annually, in 
addition to an increase in foreign steel being imported into the country, has provided the 
catalyst for the implementation of these tariffs, as anyone in almost any related industry 
and the military has a continued need for a healthy domestic steel industry. 
Additionally, domestic production of steel has been adversely affected by the 
oversupply of steel at a global level, where supply has significantly outpaced demand.8  
                                                        
6 Tolomeo, Fitzgerald, Eckleman, “US Steel Sector Thrives as Mills Move Up Quality Ladder”, S&P 
Global, May 9, 2019, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/blogs/metals/050919-us-steel-
sector-thrives-as-mills-move-up-quality-ladder 
7 IBIS World, “Iron and Steel Manufacturing Industry in the US – Market Research Report, IBIS, 
November 23, 2020, https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/market-research-reports/iron-steel-
manufacturing-industry/ 
8 United States of America, Office of Technology Evaluations, and John Worrell. The Effect of Imports of 






C. A Protectionist Push Back Against Globalization  
 It is difficult for nation-states to operate and compete in the current era of 
globalization. How a democratic country with a wide dispersal of power that operates in 
a mostly capitalistic economy can maintain healthy domestic industries in relation to 
other countries who operate under different forms of government and economic systems 
is complicated. The U.S. steel industry competes with China, India, Argentina, Spain, 
Europe and Japan’s steel industries. In the face of such widespread competition, it is 
tempting to withdraw from international trade deals to protect oneself, and it’s within 
this context that Trump desired to withdrawal from treaties and impose tariffs. His 
instinctive reaction was to safeguard American industries. 
Protectionism is the act of shielding a country’s domestic industries from 
foreign competition by imposing restrictions, tariffs, or taxes on domestic importers 
who purchase foreign products. A government may choose to impose these restrictions 
in hopes of encouraging its corporations and citizens to purchase domestic goods over 
foreign goods. A tax levied on domestic producers who purchase foreign goods, in 
theory, can make a Chinese made steel hammer cost more than an American made steel 
hammer. So then when my grandmother shops at Home Depot, she will purchase the 
less expensive domestically made hammer before she would purchase the taxed and 
therefore more expensive Chinese-made hammer. While this may be good for the 
American tool industry, the price point for hammer may end up being higher overall. 
My grandmother will have to pay more for a product she could hypothetically get for 




A tariff is a tax on a product produced outside of America. The tax is not on the 
foreign country, but on the domestic company that imports foreign goods. In 2018 
Donald Trump altered the foundations of global trade by imposing tariffs on billions of 
dollars’ worth of goods from foreign countries all around the world.9 These tariffs are 
how he and his administration wished to carry out his protectionist policies. “America 
First” is what he promised in his inaugural speech. What he did was an abrupt departure 
from the global free trade system that has been in place since the end of WWII. Would 
the imposition of these steel tariffs work to stop the decline of the U.S. steel industry? 
Would these protectionist tariffs aid domestic industries in the long term, but create 
higher costs for our citizenry in the short term? 
                                                        
9 Erika York, “Tracking the Economic Impact of U.S. Tariffs and Retaliatory Actions”, Tax Foundation, 




II. How Trump Imposed Steel Tariffs  
A. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
Global economic relationships have been increasing and expanding in scope 
ever since the end of World War II. The United States strongly encouraged the concept 
of free trade during the post war period, in hopes of bringing consumer costs down for 
its own citizens and companies. Through its implementation of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, America hoped to “Promote the general welfare, foreign policy, and 
security of the United States through international trade agreements and through 
domestic assistance to domestic industry, agriculture, labor, and for other purposes.”10 
The Trade Expansion Act did provide an escape hatch for policies that were deemed 
harmful to domestic interests. Section 232 of the Act allows the President, along with 
the review and recommendation of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, to impose tariffs 
on specific products or industries, if “an article is being imported into the United States 
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten or impair the national 
security” of the United States.11 Although use of Section 232 in this way has been 
subject to recent legal wrangling, Trump’s administration imposed tariffs by 
presidential proclamation without consulting congress.12 Prior to Trump’s presidency, 
Section 232 was invoked twice; President Carter invoked Section 232 in 1979 and 
                                                        
10 “Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States.” Federal Register, National Archives and Records 
Administration, March 15, 2018, www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/03/15/2018-05478/adjusting-
imports-of-steel-into-the-united-states. 
11 Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the U.S, Federal Register.  
12 Inu Manak and Scott Lincicome, “The USCIT Dumps Trump’s Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum 






President Reagan did so in 1982. Section 232 has not been cited since the World Trade 
Organization was founded in 1995, an organization formed as a conduit to facilitate free 
trade amongst sovereign nations around the world. For 36 years our executive branch 
did not use Section 232 to impose protectionist policies.13 
 
B. The U.S. Department of Commerce: A Departure from Past Norms 
On January 11, 2018, the U.S. Department of Commerce and Wilbur Ross produced 
a report titled, “The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security.”14 This report 
was made under the auspices of Section 232 and produced four main findings: 
1) That steel is an important material for domestic security, and by extension, the 
domestic manufacturing of steel is of high importance for the protection of the 
national government and its people.  
2) The high level of foreign importation of steel adversely impacts the economic 
welfare of the U.S. steel industry, therefore posing a threat to national defense.  
3) The disappearance of domestic steel production has weakened our internal 
economy. 
4) The growing supply of foreign steel production is the leading cause for the 
disappearance of our domestic steel production.15 
 
Based on this report, Secretary Ross concluded that the erosion of U.S. steel 
manufacturing, and its impact on the economy, had the potential to impair national 
                                                        
13 Chad Bown, “Trump has Announced Massive Aluminum and Steel Tariffs”, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, March 1, 2018, https://www.piie.com/commentary/op-eds/trump-has-
announced-massive-aluminum-and-steel-tariffs 
14 United States of America, Office of Technology Evaluations, and John Worrell, The Effects of Imports 
of Steel on U.S. Economy. 




security as defined by Section 232 in the TEA.16 He recommended that President 
Trump “take immediate action by adjusting the level of these imports through quotas or 
tariffs. The quotas or tariffs imposed should be sufficient, even after any exceptions (if 
granted), to enable U.S. steel producers to operate at an 80 percent or better average 
capacity utilization rate…”  
 
C. Trump’s Presidential Proclamation and a Twenty-five Percent Tariff 
On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued Proclamation 9705 titled, “Adjusting 
Imports of Steel Into the United States.” The Proclamation states that, “…present 
quantities of steel article imports and the circumstances of global excess capacity for 
producing steel are resulting in the persistent threat of further closures of domestic steel 
production facilities and the ‘shrinking [of our] ability to meet national security 
production requirements in a national emergency.’” The Proclamation was an attempt to 
make good his promise to “Make America Great Again” which required him to be 
tough on foreign competition. Trump felt that there were certain countries playing by 
unfair rules and by acting he could help level the playing field. Later in the 
proclamation, he stated “In the exercise of these authorities, I have decided to adjust the 
imports of steel articles by imposing a 25 percent ad valorem tariff on steel articles…In 
my judgment, this tariff is necessary and appropriate in light of the many factors I have 
considered, including the Secretary's report, updated import and production numbers for 
2017, the failure of countries to agree on measures to reduce global excess capacity.” 
                                                        




This Proclamation exempted two of our biggest trading parties, Canada and Mexico, 
from these tariffs. Later, Argentina, Brazil and South Korea would also be made 

















                                                        




III. International Steel Production & China 
Our domestic steel companies don’t operate in a vacuum, especially in the era of 
global economic integration. A 2018 U.S. Commerce Department reported that there 
were 36 million metric tons of steel imported while 81.6 million metric tons were 
produced domestically; the U.S. imported roughly 40% of the steel it used by year end 
2017.18 Although most of our nation’s steel imports come from Canada, Brazil, 
Argentina and South Korea, China, as the biggest producer of steel in the world by far, 
must be taken into account when considering whether the Section 232 tariffs were 
effective in helping United States steel companies.  
Due to its massive productivity potential, China wields an oversized influence 
on U.S. [and global] steel prices. In one month, China produces as much steel as the 
United States does in one year. China is the biggest producer of steel in the world. In 
fact, in terms of global steel production, China accounts for more than half of the 
world’s steel production per year at 53%.19 This gives China an enormous amount of 
leverage over the international steel markets. Their decisions impact every country and 
company which produces steel, including those based in the United States.  
There are a few reasons why this Chinese domination of the steel industry has 
been harmful for U.S. companies. First, in the United States, steel companies are 
private, meaning they are for profit business which rely little on government financial 
assistance. Our steel companies play by the free-market rules which determines how 
                                                        
18 Global Steel Trade Monitor , “Steel Import Report: United States”, International Trade Administration, 
May 20, https://legacy.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/imports-us.pdf  





much steel is demanded, and therefore produced, and what the price will be. In China, 
much of the steel industry is nationalized, meaning the central Chinese government has 
enormous input on steel production and employment.20 If China decides they need to 
build high-rises and train tracks and bridges, both internally and internationally, their 
government can dictate demand and supply. These Chinese-sponsored projects has 
enabled their capacity utilization to skyrocket.21  
 Second, there is an overproduction of steel on a global scale. One of the reasons 
for this global glut is how the Chinese produce steel. Most steel made in China is 
created by using blast furnaces. Blast furnaces take raw iron ore, heat it until it becomes 
molten iron, then through a purification process the molten iron is converted into 
gigantic chunks of material known as cuboids. Steel products are then carved out of 
these cuboids. These furnaces are super productive, and cost effective, and despite their 
environmental limitations are incredibly effective at rapidly pumping out steel. 
However, these blast furnaces must be kept going continuously because if they were 
turned off, the iron ore would collect at the bottom of the furnace and harden into a very 
inflammable material, which is incredibly difficult and costly to remove. Therefore, 
these blast furnaces must produce continuously, leading in part to overproduction of 
steel.22 
 Third, China has very limited environmental and safety regulations compared to 
the United States.  If a Chinese company were to violate air or water laws, the 
                                                        
20 Scott Paul, “The Chinese Steel Steal: How They Do It”, Alliance for American Manufacturing, 
YouTube, 14 August 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uwgdhfOHfqg 
21 Elizabeth Braw, “Don’t Let China Steal Your Steel Industry”, ForeignPolicy.com, 19 May 2020, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/19/dont-let-china-steal-your-steel-industry/ 




maximum punishment a company faces is a one-time $14,000 fine. It is unknown to 
what degree these regulations are enforced. In contrast, if any U.S. steel firms are found 
in violation of the Clean Air Act, there is an up to $32,000 fine per day when they have 
been found to be in violation of such standards.23 This allows Chinese steel companies 
to reduce their costs as compared to U.S. steel companies  
This graph from the World Steel Organization demonstrates the rapid increase in 
the global production of steel over the last two decades:  
 
Although the United States imports most of its steel from Canada, Brazil, 
Argentina and South Korea, Chinese steel still wields incredibly influence over U.S. 
steel prices. What many U.S. firms have argued is that these steel imports are entering 
the country at unreasonably low prices. This concern is valid, given that Chinese 
steelmakers are playing by different rules then U.S. producers. Chinese steel is largely 
                                                        




undercutting the prices in the U.S. market, making it hard for firms to stay competitive 
over the long run. Nucor had this to say about the 232 tariffs: 
“The Section 232 steel tariffs implemented by the current administration in 2018 
are having their intended impact by preventing the dumping of steel products in 
the U.S. market…For the full year 2019, imports of finished steel were down 
approximately 18% from the previous year and accounted for approximately 
19% of U.S. market share…Approximately six million fewer tons of imports 
entered the United States in 2019 than in 2018. The comprehensive nature of the 
Section 232 tariffs is also preventing the transshipment of artificially low-priced 
steel through third party countries.” (Nucor, annual report 2019, pg. 39). 
 
What U.S. firms were hoping for was that steel imports would cost more and therefore 





IV. Domestic Steel Financials and Tariff Response 
Did the Section 232 tariffs make U.S. steel companies more profitable? Did 
higher profits result in additional hiring of employees? The three biggest U.S. steel 
companies by market capitalization are Nucor Corporation at $17 billion, Steel 
Dynamics Incorporated at slightly over $8 billion, and United States Steel Corporation 
at $4.3 billion. Because the tariffs would have the largest impact upon the largest 
companies, an analysis of their public financial statements could give a window into 
whether the 232 tariffs effected any change. The cumulative sales of each organization, 
their profit levels (described as earnings) and employment level for each company are 
reviewed below. All information is from their annual reports.  
 
A. Nucor Corporation 
For many years the Nucor Corporation has been labeled the gold standard of 
U.S. steel. For over a decade now, Nucor has been the overall leader in total sales for 
U.S. firms. The company had been showing tremendous growth from 2016 to 2018.24 
By yearend 2017, total sales had increased 25% from the year before to $20.2 billion, 
up from $16.2 billion. Net earnings increased by 53% and employment by the end of 
2017 was at 25,100 up 5% from the previous year 23,900 level.25 Nucor continued their 
success from 2017 into 2018, with net sales again rising 24%, going from $20.2 billion 
to $25 billion. Earnings increased by 80% and employment once again was up 5% to 
                                                        
24 2016 Annual Report, Nucor Corporation, 2016, https://nucor.gcs-web.com/static-files/c13b6849-ace4-
4b66-b1bd-a33df46f5e87 





26,300. 2018 was the first year in which the Trump tariffs were implemented. It appears 
the new tariff protections were serving as a boost to this already strong company run.26 
The story was much different in 2019 and 2020, however. By year end 2019, the tariffs 
had been in place for over 18 months. 2019 saw sales decline by 10% and net earnings 
falls by 40%. This decline in growth was met with a silver lining in the employment 
level as Nucor increased its employees from 26,300 to 26,800. 2020 saw sales decline 
11% and net earnings once again fell by over 40%. Sales have been reduced back to 
their 2016 levels, with the profit line falling back below what it was by year end 2016.27 
The downward trend in profitability had begun pre-pandemic. 
In comparison to their financial fundamentals, the production totals of Nucor in 
terms of tonnage of steel produced per year follows very similarly. The following totals 
are year-end production values of total steel produced. From 2016 to 2018, Nucor saw 
steel production increase every year. 2016 totals ended at 21,950,000 tons of steel 
produced, which increased to 24,390,000 tons by year-end 2017 and peaking at 
25,900,000 tons in 2018. This three-year period saw an increase in production of over 
16%. This rise in production would soon be curtailed however, as 2019 was the first full 
year that the steel tariffs had been place. In 2019, steel production dropped more than 
9% as the total amount produced settled at slightly over 23,000,000 tons.28 
The company has produced several pages in their 2019 annual report reacting to 
the implementation of the steel tariffs. In summation, they are fully behind the 
                                                        
26 2018 Annual Report, Nucor Corporation, 2018, https://nucor.gcs-web.com/static-files/5d609996-5a8d-
4810-b40a-76f894bb05b7 
27 2019 Annual Report, Nucor Corporation, 2019, https://nucor.gcs-web.com/static-files/67f7d0b6-7747-
4265-8cee-49524721d3ef 





governmental assistance. Part of their support is because Chinese steel companies are 
tremendously supported by their government. They are partially in support because the 
tariffs have reduced import levels of foreign steel into the U.S. In their own words,  
“Section 232 steel tariffs are keeping dumped steel products out of the U.S. 
market. The U.S. government is also negotiating new or renegotiating existing trade 
agreements with many countries, including China, which provide another opportunity to 
address excess steelmaking capacity. Should these efforts fail to reduce excess capacity 
and the Section 232 tariffs be lifted, U.S. steelmakers would be at risk of having to 
compete again against steel products dumped in the U.S. market.”29 
 
B. Steel Dynamics Incorporated (SDI) 
Steel Dynamics Incorporated, with a market capitalization of $8.2 billion is the 
second biggest steel company in the United States. Located in Fort Wayne, Indiana it is 
about half the size of Nucor, and proportionally it does about half the sales of its larger 
competitor. SDI is very profitable and until 2018 was seeing good growth in its sales, 
rising at around 20% in the two years prior. The company had also become 20% more 
profitable and was seeing its employment level rise modestly, at around 5% in both 
years.30 At the end of 2018, the company had grown from 7,635 full time employees to 
8,200. However, just like Nucor Corporation, 2018 marked the end of sales and 
earnings growth for SDI as well. Cumulative sales dropped by 12% in 2019, 8% in 
2020 and is down another 3% this year (in its trailing twelve months). Despite this 
decline in growth, the company managed to increase the number of employees from 
8,200 to 8,385 full time employees.31 In their 2019 annual report, the company 
                                                        
29 2019 Annual Report, Nucor, pg. 43.  
30 2017 Annual Report, Steel Dynamics Inc, 2017, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/b2icontent.irpass.cc/2197/173709.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=1Y51NDPSZK99K
T3F8VG2&Expires=1620085366&Signature=VHG5AWQR1LKOS%2Bzdpp1CwOwmXio%3D 




mentioned that global steelmaking capacity is greater than the total steel requirement, 
which acutely affects U.S. steel making companies. As with Nucor, they are steadfast in 
their beliefs that steel tariffs are beneficial to their business and points to Chinese 
manufacturers overproducing necessary levels of steel as the main reason in which 
worldwide prices are declining as rapidly as they are. Additionally, SDI comments that 
many foreign producers of steel are subsidized and controlled by foreign governments, 
which in turn negatively impacts U.S. steel prices due to harmful political and economic 
policies that impact that international price of steel. In turn, U.S. firms must lower the 
price of their steel to remain competitive on an international and domestic level. In 
essence, SDI believes that tariffs provide necessary protection for their industry.32 
“A higher volume of steel imports into the United States tends to occur at 
depressed prices when steel producing countries experience periods of economic 
difficulty, decreased demand for steel products or excess capacity. The global 
steelmaking overcapacity is exacerbated by Chinese steel production capacity 
that far exceeds that country’s demand and has made China a major global 
exporter of steel, resulting in weakened global steel pricing than otherwise 
would be expected. While tariffs pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (‘‘Section 232’’), other measures to curb 
unfair trade such as duties or quotas, and the renegotiation of trade agreements 
with other countries, including the recently signed United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (‘‘USMCA’’), have decreased the volume of steel and steel 
products imports in the United States, domestic steel and steel products prices 
remain negatively impacted by excessive imports of steel and steel products into 
the United States.” (SDI, annual report 2019, pg. 20).  
 
 Like Nucor, SDI saw a growth in production from 2016-2018 and then a decline 
in 2019. Production went from 8 million tons in 2016 to 8.27 million tons in 2017 and 
then peaked at 8.92 million tons in 2018. This 11% increase in production over three 
years came to an end in 2019, when production was cut by 4% to 8.59 million tons. The 
                                                        




top 104 steel producing companies in the world saw a decline in steel production in the 
year 2019, following tariff implementation in 2018. None of the biggest steel producers 
were exempt from this decline in production and that extended to the biggest U.S. steel 
producers as well. U.S. steel was no exemption.33 
C. U.S. Steel 
As much as Nucor and SDI have struggled over the last few years, it’d be hard 
to argue either had it tougher than U.S. Steel. At yearend 2018, U.S. Steel had seen 
record sales and record profits to go along with a record profit margin. Since then, sales 
have fallen over 30% and its profit margin has turned negative. After posting a $1.1 
billion dollar profit in 2018, the 2019 and 2020 bottom lines have turned negative 
figures, with the company posting a -$630 million and -$1.1 billion-dollar loss in back-
to-back years. It has seen its liquidity continue to decline and has seen its free cash flow 
turn negative, both of which measure the struggling cash position the company appears 
to be in. In an excerpt from their most recent 10-K filings, they state that their most 
recent decline in sales is a result of, “The decrease in net sales in 2019 as compared to 
2018 was primarily due to lower average realized prices in all of our reportable 
segments…”.34 Unfortunately, the annual reports from U.S. Steel did not produce 
tangible steel employment levels. There was however a slight increase in the hiring 
levels at U.S. Steel from mid 2018 to now. 
The story of production for U.S. Steel is very much the same as it was for Nucor 
and SDI. From 2016 to 2018, production rose 8.5%, going from 14.22 million tons 
                                                        
33 World Steel, Top Steel-Producing Companies.  





produced to 15.37 in 2018. In 2019, production dropped nearly 10% as production went 
from 15.37 million tons to 13.89 million tons. As we have seen from these three 
companies, a drop in global steel prices is the main reason for the reduction in steel 
sales and profit, however the decrease in production also plays a role in profitability as 
well.35   
Although production declined in the months and years following the 
implementation of the 232 tariffs, steel imports into the U.S declined as well.36 This 
increased reliance on importation, that had been growing for decades, was a mounting 
problem for the U.S. steel industry at large. Although the U.S. does not import a 
significant amount of steel from China, their footprint on the steel industry is massive. 
Taking a closer look at their country’s steel industry helps explain why Trump and his 
administration thought these tariffs were important in the first place.  
Reviewing the financials of the top three producing steel companies in the 
United States, it becomes apparent that they all support the section 232 tariffs. The CEO 
of U.S. Steel is David Burritt and although he is undoubtedly biased towards the steel 
industry, he makes a good point when he notes that the steel industry is foundational to 
this country, “We know that we’re foundational to the U.S.A….Have to be able to make 
things in the United States, if you outsource fundamental foundational things to your 
country then you’re at the whim of bad actors and others who can shut you down. It’s 
not just the military that’s affected, it’s the roads, bridges, infrastructure and as you 
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36 Global Steel Trade Monitor, “Steel Imports Report: United States”, International Trade Administration, 




mentioned it’s the jobs.” Later in his interview, he doubles down on this claim, stating 
that the United States has been in a trade war with China for 30 years.37 
 
D. Graphs Displaying Company Health  
 
 The three steel companies follow a similar trajectory. Sales are generally rising 
from 2015 through 2018, the year the 232 tariffs are implemented, and then are reduced 
by 10-20% following tariff implementation. This is a trend that will be familiarized 
through examination of their other financial indicators.  
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 The ‘upside down v’ trend continues from company sales into total production 
for each company. This graph displays the total steel production of the three main steel 
companies from 2016-2019. In the case of all three companies, their most productive 
year by totals, was in 2018, followed by a noticeable decline in 2019. Unfortunately, no 
results could be found for their 2020 year-end totals, however, with the COVID-19 
crisis overwhelming our society/economy by late April, it’s fair to conclude that 
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 Firm profitability, once again, enhances the trend that is now familiar. 2018 was 
the defining year for the biggest U.S. steel companies.38 A high price, strong demand 
and perhaps excitement over the newly implemented tariffs, led to the most profitable 
12 months these companies have seen all decade.39  
 
 
 Company employment is the only statistic that bucks the upside-down v trend. 
Nucor is the only company who decreased employment in 2019 after increasing it in 
2018.40 SDI managed to increase their employment year by year from 2016 through 
2020.41 U.S. Steel however saw a decline in their employment levels every year since 
2016.42 
 
                                                        
38 YCharts, “SDI Net Income (Annual)”, December 31, 2020, 
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39 YCharts, “Nucor Net Income (Annual)” 
40 Nucor Annual Report, 2020.  
41 SDI Annual Report, 2020.  
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V. Direction of the U.S. Steel Industry – Post Tariff Implementation 
 After a thorough analysis of the three largest domestic steel companies in the 
United States, this section will expand out and look at the steel industry from a national 
perspective. The results below, in addition to the takeaways from Nucor, SDI and U.S. 
Steel and analysis of the international steel industry, will determine whether Trump’s 
implementation of steel tariffs was a net-positive or net-negative for the industry at 
large.  
A. Production  
Production saw an increase of just under 11% in the years after 2016. Production 
grew from 81 million tons of steel produced in 2017, to 88 million tons in 2019 and 
capped out at 89 million tons in 2019.43 This would indicate that the steel tariffs had a 
modest, positive impact on cumulative steel production. COVID-19 effected the U.S. 
economy beginning in March of 2020 and must be considered in evaluating the health 
of the steel industry.  
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Source: U.S. Geological Survey, American Iron and Steel Institute with FactCheck.org 
B. Pricing  
“The 25% tariffs on imported steel then boosted prices in the U.S., at least for 
2018, which was good news for steel companies’ bottom lines.”44 This evidence 
confirms the information seen in the analysis of profitability of the three biggest steel 
companies in a prior section. Although prices initially jumped for American-made steel, 
they quickly came back down to earth, resulting in substandard profitability in years 
2019 and 2020. Companies that use steel as intermediate goods also claimed tariffs 
impacted their profitability. ‘With the price spike, the mills were “minting money,” the 
editorial argued, “to the detriment of America’s consumers and steel-reliant industries.” 
Ford Motor Co. said its tariff costs on steel and aluminum amounted to $750 million in 
2018,45 and Caterpillar said it would raise prices in the second half of 2018 to offset 
higher costs due to the tariffs.46
 
                                                        
44 Lori Robertson and Eugene Kelly, “Trump’s Steel Industry Claims” 
45 Tom Krisher, “Ford posts quarterly loss amid struggles in Europe, China”, AP, January 23, 2019, 
https://apnews.com/article/5717a1e50ef746c6a87bd484cb8a29a1 














Source: Argus Media, a global service provider for various commodities 
 
C. Imports 
In essence, steel imports were the main factor that the 232 tariffs were meant to 
address. There was a concern among the administration that companies based in the 
U.S. were becoming too reliant on foreign made steel. The U.S. economy demands 
more steel than its companies produce each year meaning we will continue to rely on a 
certain level of imported steel to meet demand. That being said, the main goal of the 
steel tariffs was to reduce the level of imported steel into the country, which appears to 
have happened. Total imports are 30% lower since the beginning of 2018.47  
 
Source: U.S. Geological Survey, American Iron and Steel Institute with FactCheck.org 
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D. Capacity Utilization  
 In many ways, capacity utilization and imported steel are very closely related. In 
the report done by the Secretary of Commerce, which prompted tariff implementation, 
they noted that capacity utilization was well below the 80% level, which they deemed 
as the minimum requirement for long term industry viability. They concluded that high 
importation levels heavily contributed to capacity utilization level being lower then 
where they needed to be. As a result of a lowering of the import levels, a demonstrated 
increase in the capacity utilization levels has appeared. In 2019, the 80% threshold was 
surpassed for the first time in over a decade.48 Unfortunately, in large part due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the capacity utilization level dipped back below 70% leaving the 
industry with a lot of ground to recover in the coming years.  
 
Source: U.S. Iron and Steel Institute 
                                                        

















E. Steel Employment 
  While the previous four graphs can be used to determine the health of the steel 
industry, the employment level is a variable for analyzing if average, middle-class 
American workers have benefitted from the 232 tariffs. The industry employs 
significantly less people than it has in the past, and going into the future, it’s plausible 
that technological advances will lead to less employment in the decades to come. That 
being said, when looking at employment in the year before and after the 232 tariffs, it 
clear that there was an increase, albeit modestly, in the employment level in the U.S. 
steel industry. From 2017 to 2019, steel employment increased from 80,000 to 83,000.49 
Although it appears that the corporations benefitted to a greater degree than the middle-
class workers did as a result of tariff implementation, some of the benefits were 
extended to middle class Americans as well.  
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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VI. Conclusions  
A. Micro-Economic Impact 
How did the implementation of the 232 tariffs in early 2018 effect the domestic 
steel market? Did the companies maximize or change production and capacity so that it 
could lower prices and better compete with the help of these tariffs that artificially 
increased foreign steel prices? In the months following implementation of the 232 
tariffs, there was an immediate increase in the price of U.S. steel. The price per ton in 
March of 2018 was $710, and by August the price point had jumped 20% to $890, 
which helped increase sales and profitability for the three major steel producers in the 
U.S. during that year. From 2017 to 2018, Nucor nearly doubled their profits as they 
saw a rise from $1.3 billion to nearly $2.4 billion. SDI and U.S. Steel similarly saw 
immense growth in profitability as SDI went from $850 million in profits to $1.25 
billion and U.S. Steel nearly tripled their profits, from $387 million in 2017 to $1.15 
billion by year end 2018. Although hundreds of millions of dollars were added in 
profitability over 2018-2019, there was only minimal increased hiring. In 2017, the 
industry accounted for 80,000 workers while in 2019 the domestic steel industry 
employed around 83,200. Although the slight increase in steel employment was good 
for the working class, it is far from the promise that Donald Trump made to American 
workers and families. Steel firms benefitted more from the tariffs than the average 
employee did.  
The executives of Nucor, SDI and U.S. Steel were encouraged but not entirely 
satisfied with the 232 tariffs. They agreed that the tax on domestic purchase of foreign 




business. Imports dropped from 31 million tons in 2018 to a little over 26 million tons 
in 2019. However, in the latter half of 2019 and the beginning of 2020, prices came 
back below the $710 per ton price point where steel sat during March of 2018 and 
remained in the low $600’s/high $500’s until COVID-19 disrupted the world in March 
2020. The 232 tariffs had a limited positive impact before the global marketplace 
brought U.S. prices back to pre-Tariff levels.  
This import reduction of 15% and the concurrent rising of capacity utilization to 
levels above 80% are important indicators in determining 232 effectiveness. Although 
the price per ton dropped below pre-tariff levels, production managed to increase in 
2019, even after its sharp gain in 2018. This, along with a reduction in imports is what 
commerce secretary Wilbur Ross hoped for. A modest recovery in production, coupled 
with a decline in import levels is ultimately what made these 232 tariffs moderately 
successful for the domestic steel industry. The steel tariffs have at best stabilized 
American steel or at worst slowed the decades of decline that has plagued the industry 
since the 70s. 
 
B. National Interests  
Political divides aside, Biden has chosen to keep the tariffs for now, “The Biden 
administration is reviewing its trade policies, including the fees of 25 percent on steel… 
Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said recently and also claimed the tariffs ‘helped 
save American jobs in the steel [industry].’”50 Keeping the 232 tariffs implies that right 
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now, sustaining this tax is more acceptable than letting domestic steel companies 
compete on the open market with foreign firms (and governments) that might not be 
playing by traditional, free-market rules. In the same article, a small business owner by 
the name of Charles Bernard, the president of the small Eagle Metals states that “It’s not 
great for us. The tariffs were a blunt instrument. But we need a domestic steel 
industry.”51 His first sentence is a reference to the fact that the steel tariffs raised the 
overall price of steel, which he uses as an intermediate good for some of the goods he 
manufactures. This correlates with Ford and Caterpillar raising the prices of their goods 
as well in response to the higher price of steel. Simultaneously, he acknowledges that 
the U.S. desperately needs a steel industry, for military and infrastructure projects,52 and 
the relief provided by tariffs resulted in a much-needed cushion for firms to recover.  
While global Chinese steel dominance is just one component of their growing 
power, in many ways it is a perfectly analogous microcosm of their accumulation of 
control on the global scale. China’s intense production of steel has allowed them to 
commence what is undoubtedly the centerpiece of the CCP’s foreign policy plan, 
known as the “Belt and Road Initiative”. The Belt and Road Initiative, as described by 
Trump’s former national security advisor H.R. McMaster, is a $1 trillion-dollar, global 
infrastructure plan that intends to put China at the center of a global trade route and 
communication center.53 The plan includes more than 70 countries and involves China 
making large loans to developing nations. When these countries default on their loans, 
China trades debt for equity to gain access to their ports, airports, railways and 
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52 David Burritt, “U.S. Steel CEO: We’ve Been in a Trade War for 30 Years”  





communication networks. Countries such as Pakistan, Djibouti, Mongolia and 
Kyrgyzstan, already have unsustainably high levels of debt.54   
 Although not the only input needed to carry out the plans for the Belt and Road 
Initiative, steel is a main component in the execution of this enterprise. This explains 
why China has produced enough steel to greatly contribute to the global oversupply of 
steel. China has spent the last two decades ramping up their steel industry in order to 
carry out this authoritarian method of economic and political integration. The 232 
tariffs, although they make a minor impact, is a step in the right direction. It signifies 
that our leaders are aware of China’s accelerating dominance and are willing to put up a 
fight. Similar actions are needed to curtail the rise of China. As McMaster states, 
“Without effective pushback from the United States and like-minded nations, China will 
become even more aggressive in promoting its statist economy and authoritarian 
political model…. [However]…If we compete aggressively, we have reason for 
confidence.”55 The 232 tariffs are a necessary show of strength that the U.S. needs to 
revitalize our domestic steel industry and fight back against bad foreign actors.  
C. Effects on Other Domestic Industries 
A recent Congressional report on the Section 232 tariffs goes into an in-depth 
analysis of how efforts were made to limit negative domestic impact on industries other 
than steel or aluminum. Many ‘exclusion’ requests were submitted to get an exception 
to the imposition of the tariffs, and about half were approved through the end of 2019.56  
                                                        
54 McMaster, “How China Sees the World” 
55 McMaster, “How China Sees the World” 
56 FN Congressional Research Service “Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress” 





After the tariffs were imposed, many domestic companies, and specifically the 
automotive industry, expressed concerns about the impacts on their industries. Several 
investigations were initiated by the government and by the private industries. In 2019, 
The American Automotive Policy Counsel estimated that the tariffs added $400 to the 
price of a new vehicle. As a result, many legal challenges have been brought to attempt 
to address the economic impact on “downstream” manufacturers and other industries.57 
Although the tariffs were modestly successful in terms of their impact on the 
domestic steel industry, it came at the cost of other downstream firms and industries. A 
thorough analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, however the 232 
steel tariffs proved to be damaging for peripheral industries that rely on steel as an 
input. Rising steel costs cut into bottom lines, which would not have been the case had 
the 232 tariffs not been implemented. There are always winners and losers when using 
tariffs and making a promise to improve the lives of every working-class person with 
protectionist policies is a promise that can’t be kept. Biden may or may not keep the 
steel tariffs, but it will be interesting to see how the greater trade wars will shape the 
socio-political and economic relationships that the United States has with China and 
other global competitors in the decades to come.  
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